Measles virus is highly infectious and can spread rapidly where vaccine coverage is low and isolation precautions suboptimal. We describe healthcare-associated measles transmission during the 2015-2016 measles outbreak in Mongolia, describe infection prevention gaps, and outline preventive strategies.
Measles is a highly contagious viral pathogen that is transmitted by direct contact with or airborne spread of infectious droplets [1] [2] [3] [4] . The measles infectious period begins before rash onset when nonspecific viral infection symptoms may be present; thus, early measles infections may be difficult to recognize [2, 3] . When a measles diagnosis is missed in a healthcare setting and airborne precautions are not taken, healthcareassociated outbreaks often occur [2, 3] .
In March 2015, a laboratory-confirmed outbreak of measles was detected in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, 1 year after the country was certified measles free [5] . A comprehensive investigation detailing possible reasons for reemergence has been published elsewhere [6] ; potential explanations include disruption in vaccine services after collapse of the state-run healthcare system and migration of undervaccinated persons from rural to urban areas with higher population density [6] . Measles spread to all 21 provinces within 4 months, the largest measles outbreak in Mongolia in 30 years.
The results of a case-control outbreak investigation suggested that healthcare exposure was a risk factor for measles acquisition [6] . We conducted an investigation to describe the epidemiology of healthcare-associated measles, assess hospital infection prevention and control (IPC) procedures, and make recommendations to prevent future healthcare-associated transmission.
METHODS
From 1 December 2015 through 20 June 2016, epidemiologists at the infectious disease referral center in Mongolia (National Center for Communicable Diseases), reviewed measles cases with recent hospitalization. Interviews identified patients with hospital admission during the typical incubation period (7-21 days before the first symptom). Medical records were reviewed for reported vaccination status, measles test results, hospital and community exposures, and prior hospitalization details, including exposure to other patients with measles. Similar data were collected by interview for healthcare personnel (HCP) in whom measles developed. Descriptive statistics were calculated as appropriate.
We defined a healthcare-associated measles case as a clinically diagnosed measles infection in a patient who had a hospital exposure during their incubation period, lacked a known community contact, and had a nonnegative measles test result (measles-specific immunoglobulin M or polymerase chain reaction result), if performed. Hospital exposure was defined for non-HCP as being admitted to a hospital and being a contact of a hospitalized source-patient (ie, same room or ward as a patient with measles) and for HCP as working in a hospital during the incubation period.
We assessed IPC policies and procedures at a convenience sample of 3 Ulaanbaatar city healthcare facilities with high case counts to identify gaps that might have contributed to measles transmission. A standardized data collection tool was used to assess 6 IPC domains (Table 1) [7] . A domain-specific and overall percentage score was calculated for each facility.
RESULTS
Epidemiologists from the National Center for Communicable Diseases identified 967 measles case patients with healthcare exposures, 602 (62%) of whom met the case definition for healthcare-associated measles; 547 (91%) were non-HCP and 55 (9%) were HCP. Measles testing was completed in 302 case patients, with positive results in 286 (95%). Hospital exposures among case patients occurred in 39 hospitals in Ulaanbaatar and the outlying provinces; 29 case patients (5%) came from outside Ulaanbaatar. Case frequency mirrored the larger outbreak, with the number of cases peaking in early March and declining in late March and early April 2016.
Among case patients who were HCP, the median age was 27 (interquartile range [IQR], 24-35) years. Among those who were non-HCP, the median age was 7 (IQR, 5-9) months; 165 (30%) of the non-HCP were ≥9 months of age and therefore eligible for routine vaccination. Among eligible non-HCP and HCP, respectively, 24 (15%) and 3 (5%) were reportedly vaccinated. The other 575 case patients (95%) were eligible for postexposure prophylaxis (PEP) owing to no reported vaccination. Of these, 155 (27%) were aged <6 months and therefore immunoglobulin eligible, and 420 (73%) were aged ≥6 months and eligible for measles-containing vaccine (MCV).
IPC assessments revealed deficiencies in all domains in all facilities ( Table 1 ). The highest scores were for domain 1; all facilities reported having IPC policies and infection preventionists available. The lowest scores were observed for patient and visitor protection, because all facilities traced exposed contacts but did not provide them PEP, reportedly owing to lack of guidance on implementation and limited vaccine and immunoglobulin supplies. No facilities followed a routine screening strategy to identify measles cases among patients and visitors entering the facility. None of the hospitals had negative pressure isolation capabilities, and private rooms were rarely available.
All 3 hospitals reported limited use of PPE, including respirators, among clinical staff, with limitations due in part to supply constraints. Although government policy required measles vaccination or immunity status to be recorded at HCP hire, written proof was not required (eg, HCP could simply say they were vaccinated), and records of the staff measles immunity status were not readily available. None of the facilities reported that susceptible HCP were furloughed after exposure to a measles case, nor did any have a furlough policy. Finally, none of the facilities reported checking the vaccination status of exposed patients or vaccinating exposed, susceptible patients as PEP when measles cases were identified at their facilities.
DISCUSSION
Substantial measles virus transmission occurred in healthcare facilities during the 2015-2016 measles outbreak in Mongolia. Our investigation identified 602 healthcare-associated measles cases during a 6-month period of intense case finding, but additional cases were likely to have occurred over the course of the outbreak. Our investigation revealed numerous IPC gaps that probably facilitated measles virus transmission in hospital settings, including triage and screening practices, inability to appropriately isolate suspected cases, nonvaccination of HCP, and lack of routinely available PEP due to absence of hospital-based PEP guidelines and resources for implementing them.
In settings like Mongolia with limited infrastructure and resources, addressing these widespread gaps in IPC is an important long-term goal. Investment in IPC infrastructure, including sufficient airborne isolation facilities and maintaining adequate isolation supplies and PPE, is clearly needed to prepare for emerging and reemerging infectious diseases. However, during measles outbreaks more immediate interventions to prevent healthcare-associated transmission are required, including improved triage practices and hospital-based PEP or routine vaccination campaigns of eligible hospitalized patients.
For eligible persons, PEP may protect against or lessen the severity of clinical measles infection and has demonstrated efficacy in prior measles outbreaks [1, [8] [9] [10] . Although routine vaccination with MCV begins at age 9-12 months in most countries, during outbreaks vaccine or PEP with MCV can be given to infants as young as 6 months [1, 3] . PEP with immunoglobulin may be given to infants younger than 6 months as well as those aged 6-11 months who did not also receive PEP with MCV and are within 6 days of measles exposure [1] . PEP has demonstrated effectiveness in hospital outbreaks [8] and in community outbreaks with significant healthcare overlap [9, 10] . Given the young age of non-HCP case patients and the lack of vaccination among both non-HCP and HCP case patients, a robust PEP strategy may have mitigated many of the healthcare-associated cases in this outbreak and contributed to overall outbreak control. Abbreviation: IPC, infection prevention and control. a Domain 1 included questions on IPC policies for airborne diseases, staff instruction in policies, and infection preventionist availability. Domains 2 and 3 assessed practices to identify and isolate measles cases and questions on responsible staff, cohorting practices, and ventilation type. Domain 4 assessed respirator, measles-containing vaccine and immunoglobulin availability. Domain 5 evaluated measles immunization requirements and furlough practices for healthcare personnel. Finally, domain 6 covered measles postexposure prophylaxis (ie, the administration of either measles-containing vaccine or immunoglobulin to prevent illness in nonimmune persons exposed to measles) and vaccination of eligible patients admitted for reasons other than measles.
However, a PEP strategy is resource intensive [10] . Given the limited airborne isolation capacity of Mongolian hospitals, many susceptible persons were probably exposed, and complete contact tracing would be difficult to achieve in the short time frame needed to implement a PEP strategy. Therefore, in Mongolia a simpler and more cost-effective strategy may have been to allocate sufficient vaccine and immunoglobulin stock for hospitals to ensure they could vaccinate all eligible staff and patients, regardless of identified exposure. This would have the added benefit of accelerating vaccine coverage, especially given that a large community vaccination campaign of children aged 6-71 months was ongoing.
Because HCP are at higher risk for measles virus infection and transmission to patients, other HCP, and visitors, preventing measles in this group is a high priority in outbreak response efforts [11] . Health agencies in the United States and abroad recommend that all HCP be vaccinated or that facilities have policies requiring evidence of immunity before hire [1, 11, 12] . In addition, nonpunitive furlough policies have been recommended after potential exposure, illness, or PEP [1, 11] . Mandated measles vaccination for HCP as a condition of employment and f readily accessible records of the staff measles immunity status may have reduced the risk for measles among HCP and reduced healthcare-associated transmission.
Our investigation was subject to limitations. The results of our IPC assessments may not be representative of areas beyond Ulaanbaatar; however, interviews with health officials indicate that the IPC challenges outside the city were consistent with the ones we found, if not greater. Furthermore, assessments were performed at the end of the outbreak, and observed practices may not have reflected actual practices during the outbreak. Notably, it was not possible to confirm that active measles cases were present at each hospital where case patients were exposed. However, given the community outbreak with tens of thousands of cases and the high rate of healthcare use in Mongolia, it seems likely that most hospitals were housing ≥1 measles case patient at the height of the outbreak, when these data were collected. It is also possible that cases we defined as healthcare associated had unidentified community exposures and thus were misclassified.
Our investigation highlighted challenges facing resourcelimited healthcare facilities in preventing infectious diseases such as measles. Investment in IPC infrastructure for highly infectious diseases is a critical component for prevention of outbreaks. However, in the interim, HCP vaccination and guidelines for instituting PEP or vaccination campaigns within hospitals should be considered a critical component of an outbreak response strategy; accompanying resources are needed if such guidelines are to be successfully implemented.
